Mathew D. McCubbins

Articles and Books by Area of Research:

1.           Legislative Studies

2.           Administrative Procedure/Administrative Law/Public Administration

3.           Public Policy

4.           State Politics and Policy/Initiatives and Referenda

5.           Public Law/Statutory Interpretation/Judicial Politics

6.           Institutional Design

7.           Economic Development

8. Cognition, Communication, Learning and Decision Making

 

 

 

 

 

1             Legislative Studies

1.1                     The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (with D. Roderick Kiewiet). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Spring 1991. 

1.2                     Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House (with Gary W. Cox). Berkeley: University of California Press, Spring 1993. 

1.2.1 Pages 253-273 reprinted in Classics in Congressional Politics. ed. Lisa Campoli, Eric Heberlig, and Herb Weisberg. Longman Press, 1999.

1.3                     Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the US House of Representatives (with Gary W. Cox).  Cambridge University Press, 2005.  

1.4                     Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House Second Edition (with Gary W. Cox). Cambridge University Press, 2007.  

1.5                     Congress: Structure and Policy (with Terry Sullivan). New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

1.6                     Party, Process and Policy: Studies of the History of Congress (with David Brady). Stanford University Press, 2002.

1.7                     Party, Process, and Political Change in Congress: Further New Perspectives on the History of Congress (edited with David Brady).  Stanford University Press, 2007. 

1.8                     Congressional Appropriations and the Electoral Connection (with D. Roderick Kiewiet), Journal of Politics, February 1985. 

1.9                     Appropriation Decisions as a Bilateral Bargaining Game Between the President and Congress (with D. Roderick Kiewiet). Legislative Studies Quarterly, May 1985.  

1.10               Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game (with Gary W. Cox), Journal of Politics, May 1986

1.11               Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriation Decisions (with D. Roderick Kiewiet), American Journal of Political Science, August 1988.  

1.12               Parties, Committees, and Policy Making in the U.S. Congress  (with D. Roderick Kiewiet), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, November 1989.

1.13               On the Decline of Party Voting in Congress (with Gary W. Cox). Legislative Studies Quarterly, November 1991.

1.14               Party Coherence on Roll Call Votes in the U.S. House of Representatives (with Gary W. Cox), in Encyclopedia of the American Legislative System, edited by Joel H. Silbey. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994.  

1.15               Bonding, Structure, and the Stability of Political Parties: Party Government in the House (With Gary W. Cox), Legislative Studies Quarterly, May 1994.

1.15.1                    Reprinted in Shepsle, Kenneth, and Barry Weingast, eds. Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions. Ann Arbor, Mi., University of Michigan Press 1995.

1.16               Who Controls? Information and the Structure of Legislative Decision Making (with Arthur Lupia). Legislative Studies Quarterly, November 1994.

1.16.1                    Reprinted in Shepsle, Kenneth, and Barry Weingast, eds. Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions. Ann Arbor, Mi., University of Michigan Press 1995.

1.17               Partisan Allocation of the Personal Vote in Japan and the United States (with Frances M. Rosenbluth). In Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States, eds. Peter Cowhey and Mathew McCubbins. New York: Cambridge University Press, August 1995.

1.18               As a Matter of Faction: The Budgetary Implications of Shifting Factional Control in Japan’s LDP (with Michael Thies). Legislative Studies Quarterly, August 1997.  

1.18.1                    Reprinted in Ramseyer, Mark, ed., Japanese Law and Legal Theory: The Political Economy of Japanese Law. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 2000.

1.18.2                    Reprinted in Ramseyer, Mark, ed., Japanese Law.  Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2002.

1.19               Legislative Process. In The Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought, eds. Barry Clarke and Joe Foweraker, Routledge Press, 2000

1.20               Towards a Theory of Legislative Rules Changes: A Response to Schickler and Rich (with Gary W. Cox). American Journal of Political Science, July 1997.

1.21               Agenda Power in the Japanese House of Representatives (with Gary Gox and Mikitaka Masuyama). Japanese Journal of Political Science, Fall 2000.  

1.22               Agenda Power in the US House of Representatives, 1877 to 1986 (with Gary W. Cox). In David W. Brady and Mathew D. McCubbins eds., Parties, Procedure and Policy: Essays on the History of Congress, Stanford University Press, 2002.  

1.23               Agenda Power in the US Senate, 1877 to 1986 (with Andrea Campbell and Gary W. Cox). In David W. Brady and Mathew D. McCubbins eds., Parties, Procedure and Policy: Essays on the History of Congress, Stanford University Press, 2002.  

1.24               Agenda Power in Brazil´s Câmara dos Deputados, 1989 to 1998 (with Octavio Amorim Neto and Gary W. Cox).  World Politics, 2003.  

1.25               A Precis on Party Leadership (with Gary Cox). Extensions, Carl Albert Congressional Research and Studies Center.  Fall 2003.

1.26               Theories of Legislative Organization (with Gary Cox).  American Political Science Association – Comparative Politics Newsletter, Winter 2004.

1.27                Legislative Process and the Mirroring Principle. In The Handbook of the New Institutional Economics, eds. Claude Menard and Mary Shirley, Kluwer Press, 2005.

1.28               Agenda Control in the German Bundestag, 1980 - 2002 (with William Chandler and Gary W. Cox).  German Politics, March 2006.  

1.29                The Motion to Recommit in the U.S. House of Representatives (with Gary W. Cox and Chris Den Hartog), in David W. Brady and Mathew D. McCubbins eds., Process, Party and Policy Making: Further New Perspectives on the History of Congress.  2006.

2             Administrative Procedure/Administrative Law/Public Administration

2.1                     Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols vs. Fire Alarms (with Thomas Schwartz), American Journal of Political Science, February 1984.

2.1.1 Reprinted in: McCubbins, Mathew and Terry Sullivan, Congress: Structure and Policy, Cambridge University Press, 1987;

2.1.2 Reprinted in: Johnson, William C., Public Administration: Policy, Politics, and Practice, Dushkin Publishing Group;

2.1.3 Reprinted in: Cohen, Joshua and Archon Fung (eds.), Constitution, Democracy and State Power: The Institutions of Justice, London: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.

2.1.4 Reprinted in: Susan Rose-Ackerman, Economics of Administrative Law, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2007.

2.2                     Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control (with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast), Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Fall, 1987.

2.2.1 Reprinted and excerpted in: Bonfield, Arthur E. and Michael Asimow, State and Federal Administrative Law, West Publishing, 1989;

2.2.2 Reprinted in Paul Joskow (ed.) Economic Regulation, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.

2.2.3 Reprinted in Cary Coglianese and Robert Kagan, eds., Regulation and Regulatory Processes, the International Library of Essays in Law and Society, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007.

2.2.4 Reprinted in: Susan Rose-Ackerman, Economics of Administrative Law, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2007.

2.3                     The Congressional Foundations of Agency Performance (with Talbot Page). Public Choice, May 1986.

2.4                     A Theory of Congressional Delegation (with Talbot Page), in Congress: Structure and Policy, eds. Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

2.5                     Structure and Process; Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies (with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast). Virginia Law Review, March 1989.

2.5.1 Reprinted in Thomas Lyon, Regulation, Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., 2007.

2.6                     A Theory of Political Control and Bureaucratic Discretion  (with Randall L. Calvert and Barry R. Weingast). American Journal of Political Science, August 1989.

2.7                     Designing Bureaucratic Accountability (with Arthur Lupia), Law and Contemporary Problems, Winter 1994.

2.7.1 Excerpted and reprinted in E. Gellhorn and Byse (eds.) Administrative Law, Ninth Edition.

2.8                     Abdication or Delegation? Congress, the Bureaucracy, and the Delegation Diemma. Regulation. 1999, Vol. 22, No. 2. 

2.9                     Legislative Control of Bureaucratic Policy Making (with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast). Peter Newman, ed.  New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, 1998, London: Palgrave-MacMillan.

2.10               The Political Economy of Law: Decision Making by Judiciary, Legislative, Executive and Administrative Agencies (with Roger Noll and Barry R. Weingast). In The Handbook of Law and Economics, edited by A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Elsevier Press 2007.

2.11               Delegation to International Agencies (with David Lake).  In Delegation and Agency in International Organizations, edited by Hawkins, Darrin G., David Lake, Daniel Neilson, and Michael J. Tierney.  Cambridge University Press, 2006.

3             Public Policy

3.1                     Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States (with Peter Cowhey). New York: Cambridge University Press, August, 1995.

3.2                     Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy (with Stephan Haggard). Cambridge University Press, 2000. 

3.2.1 Translated and reprinted in Spanish by Fondo De Cultura Economica SA, 2004

3.3                     Policy Components of Arms Competitions , American Journal of Political Science, August 1983.

3.4                     Policy Choice as an Electoral Investment (with Gary W. Cox and Terry Sullivan). Social Choice and Welfare, December 1984.

3.5                     Constituency Influences on Legislative Policy Choice (with Terry Sullivan). Quality and Quantity, Vol. 18, 1984.

3.6                     Congressional Appropriations and the Electoral Connection (with D. Roderick Kiewiet), Journal of Politics, February 1985. 

3.7                     Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game (with Gary W. Cox), Journal of Politics, May 1986.

3.8                     Slack, Public Interest, and Structure-Induced Policy (with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast), Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations, 1990.

3.9                     Budget Policy Making and the Appearance of Power. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations, 1990.

3.10               Party Politics, Divided Government, and Budget Deficits, in The Politics of Economic Policy in The U.S. and Japan, edited by Samuel Kernell. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991.

3.11               Party Governance and U.S. Budget Deficits: Divided Control and Fiscal Stalemate, in Politics and Economics in the Eighties, edited by Alberto Alesina and Geoffrey Carliner, National Bureau of Economic Research. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.

3.12               Government on Lay-Away: Federal Spending and Deficits Under Divided Government, in The Politics of Divided Government, edited by Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.  

3.13               Fiscal Policy and Divided Government (with Gary W. Cox), in The Politics of Divided Government, edited by Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.  

3.14               Equilibrium Behavior and the Appearance of Power: Legislators, Bureaucrats and the Budget Process in the U.S. and Japan (with Gregory Noble). In Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States, eds. Peter Cowhey and Mathew McCubbins. New York: Cambridge University Press, August 1995. 

3.14.1                    Reprinted in Milhaupt, Curtis J., J. Mark Ramseyer, and Michael K. Young (eds.), Japanese Law in Context: Readings in Society, The Economy, and Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.

3.14.2                    Reprinted in The International Library of Essays in Law and Legal Theory, 2nd Series. ed., J. Mark Ramseyer. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited.

3.15               Perceptions and Realities of Japanese Budgeting (with Gregory Noble). In Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States, eds. Peter Cowhey and Mathew McCubbins. New York: Cambridge University Press, August 1995.  

3.16               The Politics of Nuclear Power in Japan and the United States (with Linda Cohen and Frances M. Rosenbluth). in Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States, eds. Peter Cowhey and Mathew McCubbins. New York: Cambridge University Press, August 1995.

3.17               The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act (with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast). Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Spring 1999.  

3.18               Politics, Institutions, and Outcomes: Electricity Regulation in Argentina and Chile (with William Heller). Journal of Policy Reform, 1997.

3.19               Political Institutions and Economic Development: The Case of Electric Utility Regulation in Argentina and Chile (with William Heller), in Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy, Cambridge University Press, 2000.

3.20               The Elusive Links Between Governance and Biodiversity (with C. Barrett, C. Gibson, and B. Hoffman).  Conservation Biology, 2006. 

4             State Politics and Policy/Initiatives and Referenda

4.1                     Stealing the Initiative: How State Government Responds to Direct Democracy. (with Elisabeth Gerber, Arthur Lupia, and D. Roderick Kiewiet). Prentice-Hall, 2001.

4.2                     Putting the State Back into State Government: The Constitution and the Budget. In Constitutional Reform in California: Making State Government More Effective and Responsive, eds. Bruce Cain and Roger Noll. Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, September 1995.

4.3                     When Do State Governments Overturn Election Results? (with Elizabeth Gerber and Arthur Lupia). Journal of Politics, 2004. 

4.4                     Social Choice, Crypto-Initiatives and Policy Making by Direct Democracy (with Thad Kousser).  Southern California Law Review, 2005.

4.5                     The Dual Path Initiative Framework (with Elizabeth Garrett).  Southern California Law Review 80:2.  January, 2007. 

4.6                     When Does the Ballot Box Limit the Budget?  Politics and Spending Limits in California, Colorado, Utah and Washington (with Thad Kousser and Kaj Rozga).  In Elizabeth Garrett and Elizabeth Graddy, eds., Fiscal Challenges, Cambridge University Press, 2007  

5             Public Law/Statutory Interpretation/Judicial Politics

5.1                     Congress, The Courts and Public Policy: Policy Consequences of the "One Man, One Vote" Rule (with Thomas Schwartz), American Journal of Political Science, May 1988.

5.2                     Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation (with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast), Georgetown Law Journal, February 1992.

5.2.1 Reprinted in Sutherland Statutory Construction 5th, 6th and 7th Editions.

5.3                     Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation (with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast), Law and Contemporary Problems, Winter 1994.

5.3.1 Reprinted in Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Public Law.  Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 2007.

5.4                     Political Control of the Judiciary: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law (with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast). The University of Southern California Law Review, September 1995. 

5.5                     Lost in Translation: Social Choice Theory is Misapplied Against Legislative Intent (with Arthur Lupia).  Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, 2005.

5.6                     Canonical Construction and Statutory Revisionism: The Strange Case of the Appropriations Canon (with Daniel B. Rodriguez).  Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, 2005. 

5.7                     Statutory Interpretation and The Intentional(ist) Stance (with Cheryl Boudreau and Daniel B. Rodriguez).  Loyola Law Review, 2006.

5.8                     Courts, Congress and Public Policy, Part I: The FDA, the Courts and the Regulation of Tobacco (with Jeff Lax).  Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, 2006.  

5.9                     Courts, Congress and Public Policy, Part II: The Impact of the Reapportionment Revolution on Urban and Rural Interests (with Jeff Lax).  Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, 2006.  

5.10               Conditions for Judicial Independence (with Roger Noll and Barry R. Weingast).  Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, 2006.

5.11               What Statutes Mean: Lessons From Positive Theories of Communication and Legislation (with Cheryl Boudreau, Arthur Lupia and Daniel B. Rodriguez).  San Diego Law Review, 2007.

5.12               An Introduction to PPT and the Law (with Daniel B. Rodriguez).  In The Handbook of Positive Political Economy, edited by Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman, Oxford University Press, 2006.

6             Institutional Design

6.1                     The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? (with Arthur Lupia). Cambridge University Press, 1998. 

6.1.1 Translated and reprinted in Japanese by Bokutakusha Ltd. 2005.

6.1.2 Chapter 1 reprinted in, An American Government Reader, Pearson Custom Publishing, 2007.

6.2                     Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States (with Peter Cowhey). New York: Cambridge University Press, August, 1995.

6.3                     The Origins of Liberty: Political and Economic Liberalization in the Modern World (with Paul Drake). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.

6.4                     Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy (with Stephan Haggard). Cambridge University Press, 2000. 

6.4.1 Translated and reprinted in Spanish by Fondo De Cultura Economica SA, 2004

6.5                     The Politics of Flatland (with Thomas Schwartz). Public Choice, Vol. 46, No. 1, 1985.

6.6                     When is Delegation Abdication: How Citizens Use Institutions to Make Their Agents Accountable (with Arthur Lupia). European Journal of Political Research, 1999.

6.7                     Political Structure and Economic Liberalization: Conditions and Cases from the Developing World (with William Heller and Phil Keefer). The Origins of Liberty: Political and Economic Liberalization in the Modern World, eds. Paul Drake and Mathew McCubbins. Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1998.

6.8                     Political Institutions and the Determinants of Public Policy (with Stephan Haggard), in Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy, Cambridge University Press, 2000.

6.9                     The Institutional Determinants of Economic Policy Outcomes (with Gary W. Cox), in Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy, Cambridge University Press, 2000.

6.10               The Institutional Foundations of Political Competence (with Arthur Lupia) Elements of Reason, eds. Arthur Lupia, Mathew McCubbins, and Samuel Popkin. Cambridge University Press, 2000.

6.10.1                    Reprinted in Saward, Michael ed., Critical Concepts in Political Science.  Oxfordshire, Routledge, November 2006.

6.11               Gridlock and the Democratic Tradeoff Between Decisiveness and Resoluteness. In The Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought, eds. Barry Clarke and Joe Foweraker, Routledge Press, 2000.

6.12               The Dual Path Initiative Framework (with Elizabeth Garrett).  Southern California Law Review 80:2.  January, 2007. 

6.13               American Political Geography (with David Brady).  In Process, Party and Policy Making: Further New Perspective on the History of Congress, Edited by David Brady and Mathew D. McCubbins, Stanford University Press, 2007.

7             Economic Development

7.1                     The Origins of Liberty: Political and Economic Liberalization in the Modern World (with Paul Drake). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.

7.2                     Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy (with Stephan Haggard). Cambridge University Press, 2000. 

7.2.1 Translated and reprinted in Spanish by Fondo De Cultura Economica SA, 2004

7.3                     The Institutional Determinants of Economic Policy Outcomes (with Gary W. Cox), in Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy, Cambridge University Press, 2000.

8             Cognition, Communication, Learning and Decision Making

8.1                     The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? (with Arthur Lupia). Cambridge University Press, 1998. 

8.1.1 Translated and reprinted in Japanese by Bokutakusha Ltd. 2005.

8.1.2 Chapter 1 reprinted in, An American Government Reader, Pearson Custom Publishing, 2007.

8.2                     Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice and the Bounds of Rationality (with Arthur Lupia and Samuel Popkin). Cambridge University Press, 2000. 

8.3                     Rationality and the Foundations of Positive Political Theory (with Michael Thies). Leviathan (in Japanese), Fall 1996.

8.4                     Constructing a Theory of Reasoning (with Arthur Lupia and Samuel L. Popkin) Elements of Reason, eds. Arthur Lupia, Mathew McCubbins, and Samuel Popkin. Cambridge University Press, 2000.

8.5                     Beyond Rationality: Reason and the Study of Politics (with Arthur Lupia and Samuel L. Popkin) Elements of Reason, eds. Arthur Lupia, Mathew McCubbins, and Samuel Popkin. Cambridge University Press, 2000.

8.6                     When Does Deliberating Improve Decision Making? (with Daniel B. Rodriguez).  Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, 2006.